






The Strategic Use of Ambiguity
Frank Riedel and Linda Sass
IMW · Bielefeld University
Postfach 100131




The Strategic Use of Ambiguity
Frank Riedel∗ Linda Sass
August 2, 2011
Abstract
Ambiguity can be used as a strategic device in some situations. To
demonstrate this, we propose and study a framework for normal form
games where players can use Knightian uncertainty strategically. In
such Ellsberg games, players may use Ellsberg urns in addition to
the standard objective mixed strategies. We assume that players are
ambiguity–averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler. While clas-
sical Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the new game, there arise
new Ellsberg equilibria that can be quite different from Nash equi-
libria. A negotiation game with three players illustrates this finding.
Another class of examples shows the use of ambiguity in mediation.
We also highlight some conceptually interesting properties of Ellsberg
equilibria in two person games with conflicting interests.
1 Introduction
It occurs in daily life that a certain vagueness or ambiguity is in one’s own
favor. This might happen in very private situations where the disclosure of
all information might put oneself into a bad position, but also in quite public
situations when a certain ambiguity, as one intuitively feels, leads to a better
outcome. Indeed, committee members at universities know only too well how
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useful it can be to play for time; in particular, it is sometimes extremely useful
to create ambiguity where there was none before. Such strategic ambiguity
might include a threat about future behavior (“I might do this or even the
contrary if . . .”). Past presidents of Reserve Banks became famous for being
intelligently ambiguous (although the debate is not decided if this was always
for society’s good).
Accounts of strategic ambiguity, of a more verbal nature, can be found
in different fields. This includes the use of ambiguity as a strategic instru-
ment in US foreign policy, Benson and Niou (2000), and in organizational
communication, Eisenberg (1984). Economists found the presence of strate-
gic ambiguity to explain incompleteness of contracts, Mukerji (1998), and
policies of insurance fraud detection, Lang and Wambach (2010).
This paper takes a look at such strategic use of ambiguity in games. The
recent advances in decision theory, based on Ellsberg’s famous experiments
and Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty allow to model such
strategic behavior formally. Intuitively, we give players the possibility to
use Ellsberg urns, that is urns with (partly) unknown proportions of colored
balls, instead of merely using objective randomizing devices where all players
know (ideally) the probabilities. Players can thus credibly announce: “I will
base my action on the outcome of the draw from this Ellsberg urn!” Such
urns are objectively ambiguous, by design; players can thus create ambiguity.
We then work under the assumption that it is common knowledge that
players are ambiguity–averse. To have a concrete model, we adopt the
Gilboa–Schmeidler axioms and thus get pessimistic players.
To our knowledge, the only contribution in game theory in this direction1
is by Sophie Bade (2010) and, very early, by Robert Aumann (1974). Bade
shows that in two person games, the support of “ambiguous act equilibria”
is always equal to the support of some Nash equilibrium. This reminds one
of Aumann’s early discussion of the use of subjective randomizing devices in
1Of course, other applications of Knightian decision theory to normal form games with
complete information are available. Dow and Werlang (1994), Lo (1996), Eichberger and
Kelsey (2000) and Marinacci (2000) assume uncertainty about the players’ actions and
let the beliefs reflect this uncertainty. In these extensions of equilibrium in beliefs actual
strategies in equilibrium are essentially ignored. Klibanoff (1993), Lehrer (2008) and Lo
(2009) determine the actual play in equilibrium and require some consistency between
actions and ambiguous beliefs. Anyhow, the actions in equilibrium are still determined by
objective randomizing devices. In contrast, in our model players can create ambiguity by
the use of subjective randomizing devices.
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a Savage framework. If players evaluate Knightian uncertainty in a linear
way, in other words, if they conform to the Savage axioms, no new equilibria
can be generated in two person games. This might look like a quite negative,
and boring, conclusion in the sense that there is no space for interesting uses
of strategic ambiguity. We do not share this view.
In this short note, we exhibit three (classes of) examples that show, in our
opinion, that there is a rich world to explore for economists. Our examples
serve the role to highlight potential uses. In a later paper, we plan to say
more on a general theory of such Ellsberg Games.
Our first example highlights the use of strategic ambiguity in negotiations.
We take up a beautiful example of Greenberg (2000) where three parties,
two small countries in conflict, and a powerful country, the mediator, are
engaged in peace negotiations. There is a nice peace outcome; the game’s
payoffs, however, are such that in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game
the bad war outcome is realized. Greenberg argues verbally that peace can
be reached if the superpower “remains silent” instead of playing a mixed
strategy. We show that peace can indeed be an equilibrium in the extended
game where players are allowed to use Ellsberg urns. Here, the superpower
leaves the other players uncertain about its actions. This induces the small
countries to prefer peace over war.
As our second example we take a classic example by Aumann (1974) which
has a nice interpretation. It illustrates how strategic ambiguity can be used
by a mediator to achieve cooperation in situations similar to the prisoners’
dilemma. In this game a mediator is able to create ambiguity about the
reward in case of unilateral defection. If he creates enough ambiguity, both
prisoners are afraid of punishment and prefer to cooperate. The outcome
thus reached is even Pareto–improving.
A remarkable consequence of these two examples is that the strategic use
of ambiguity allows to reach equilibria that are not Nash equilibria in the
original game, even not in the support of the original Nash equilibrium. So
here is a potentially rich world to discover.
We also take a closer look at two person 2× 2 games with conflicting in-
terests, as Matching Pennies or similar competitive situations. These games
have a unique mixed Nash equilibrium. We point out two interesting fea-
tures here. The first is that, surprisingly, mutual ambiguity around the Nash
equilibrium distribution is not an equilibrium in competitive situations. Due
to the non–linearity of the payoff functions in Ellsberg games, ambiguity
around the Nash equilibrium distribution never has ambiguity as best re-
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sponse. Secondly, in the class of games we consider a new and interesting
type of equilibria arises. In these equilibria, both players create ambiguity.
They commit to strategies like, e.g.: ”I play action A with probability at
least 1/2, but I don’t tell you anything more about my true distribution.”
It seems convincing that these strategies are easier to implement in reality
than an objectively mixed Nash equilibrium strategy. In fact, an experiment
by Goeree and Holt (2001) suggests that actual behavior is closer to Ellsberg
equilibrium strategies than to Nash equilibrium strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the negotiation
example. In Section 3 we develop the framework for normal form games that
allows the strategic use of ambiguity. In Section 4 we apply the concept to the
negotiation example, Section 5 analyzes strategic ambiguity as a mediation
tool. Finally Section 6 shows how strategic ambiguity is used in competitive
situations. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Ambiguity as a Threat
Our main point here is to show that strategic ambiguity can lead to new
phenomena that lie outside the scope of classical game theory. As our first
example, we consider the following peace negotiation game taken from Green-
berg (2000). There are two small countries who can either opt for peace, or
war. If both countries opt for peace, all three players obtain a payoff of 4.
If one of the countries does not opt for peace, war breaks out, but the su-
perpower cannot decide whose action started the war. The superpower can

















Figure 1: Peace Negotiation
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As we deal here only with static equilibrium concepts, we also present
the normal form, where country A chooses rows, country B columns, and the
superpower chooses the matrix.
war peace
war 0, 9, 1 0, 9, 1
peace 3, 9, 0 4, 4, 4
punishA
war peace
war 9, 0, 0 9, 0, 0
peace 6, 0, 1 4, 4, 4
punishB
Figure 2: Peace Negotiation in normal form
This game possesses a unique Nash equilibrium where country A mixes
with equal probabilities, and country B opts for war; the superpower has no
clue who started the war given these strategies. It is thus indifferent about
whom to punish and mixes with equal probabilities as well. War occurs with
probability 1. The resulting equilibrium payoff vector is (4.5, 4.5, 0.5).
If the superpower can create ambiguity (and if the countries A and B
are ambiguity–averse), the picture changes. Suppose for simplicity, that the
superpower creates maximal ambiguity by using a device that allows for any
probability between 0 and 1 for its strategy punishA. The pessimistic play-
ers A and B are ambiguity–averse and thus maximize against the worst case.
For both of them, the worst case is to be punished by the superpower, with
a payoff of 0. Hence, both prefer to opt for peace given that the superpower
creates ambiguity. As this leads to a very desirable outcome for the super-
power, it has no incentive to deviate from this strategy. We have thus found
an equilibrium where the strategic use of ambiguity leads to an equilibrium
outcome outside the support of the Nash equilibrium outcome.
We present next a framework where this intuition can be formalized.
3 Ellsberg Games
Let us formalize the intuitive idea that players can create ambiguity with
the help of Ellsberg urns. An Ellsberg urn is, for us, a triple (Ω,F ,P) of a
nonempty set Ω of states of the world, a σ–field F on Ω (where one can take
the power set in case of a finite Ω), and a set of probability measures P on
the measurable space (Ω,F). This set of probability measures represents the
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Knightian uncertainty of the strategy: the players do not know the probabil-
ity laws that govern the state spaces Ω. A typical example would be the clas-
sical Ellsberg urn that contains 30 red balls, and 60 balls that are either black
or yellow, and one ball is drawn at random. Then the state space consists of
three elements {R,B, Y }, F is the power set, and P the set of probability
vectors (P1, P2, P3) such that P1 = 1/3, P2 = k/60, P3 = (60− k)/60 for any
k = 0, . . . , 60.
We assume that the players of our game have access to any such Ellsberg
urns; imagine that there is an independent, trustworthy laboratory that sets
up such urns and reports the outcome truthfully.
We come now to the game where players can use such urns in addition
to the usual mixed strategies (that correspond to roulette wheels or dice).
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of players. Each player has a finite strategy
set Si, i = 1, . . . , N . Let S =
∏n
i=1 Si be the set of pure strategy profiles.
Players’ payoffs are given by functions
ui : S → R (i ∈ N) .
The normal form game is denoted G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉i∈N .
Players can now use different devices. On the one hand, we assume that
they have “roulette wheels” or “dices” at their disposal, i.e. randomizing
devices with objectively known probabilities. As usual, the set of these prob-
abilities over Si is denoted by ∆Si. The set of profiles of mixed strategies is
denoted by ∆S :=
∏n
i=1 ∆Si. The players evaluate such devices according to
expected utility, as in von Neumann–Morgenstern’s axiomatization.
Moreover, and this is the new part, players can use Ellsberg urns. We
imagine that all players have laboratories at their disposal that allow them
to build Ellsberg urns and they can credibly commit to strategies that base
actions on outcomes of draws from such urns. Technically, we model this
as a triple (Ωi,Fi,Pi) as explained above. Each player i ∈ N has a finite
set of states of the world Ωi, together with a σ-algebra Fi of subsets of
Ωi, the events. An Ellsberg strategy (or Anscombe–Aumann act)
2 is then a
measurable function fi : (Ωi,Fi)→ ∆Si.
We suppose that all players involved in the game G are ambiguity–averse
in the sense that they prefer risky situations to ambiguous situations. To
2Notice that this general form of a game — without the set of probabilities Pi —
was first introduced by Aumann (1974) in his introduction of the concept of correlated
equilibrium.
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evaluate utility of a profile of acts f = (fi, f−i) and corresponding Ellsberg
urns (Ωi,Fi,Pi), the players use maxmin expected utility as axiomatized
by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The payoff of player i ∈ N at Ellsberg








ui(f(ω))dP1 . . . dPn .
We call the described larger game an Ellsberg game. An Ellsberg equi-
librium is a profile of Ellsberg urns ((Ω1,F1,P1), . . . , (Ωn,Fn,Pn)) and acts
f ∗ = (f ∗1 , . . . , f
∗
n) such that no player has an incentive to deviate, i.e. for all
players i ∈ N and all Ellsberg urns (Ωi,Fi,Pi), and all acts fi for player i
we have
Ui(f
∗) ≥ Ui(fi, f ∗−i) .
This definition depends on the particular Ellsberg urn used by each player
i ∈ N . There are a large number of possible state spaces and sets of proba-
bility measures for each player. Fortunately there is a more concise way to
define Ellsberg equilibrium. The procedure is similar to the reduced form of
a correlated equilibrium, see Aumann (1974) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
Instead of working with arbitrary Ellsberg urns, we note that the players’
payoff depends, in the end, on the set of distributions that the Ellsberg urns
and the associated acts induce on the set of strategies. One can then work
with that set of distributions directly.
Definition 1. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉i∈N be a normal form game. A reduced
form Ellsberg equilibrium of the game G is a profile of sets of probability
measures P∗i ⊆ ∆Si, such that for all players i ∈ N and all sets of probability

















The two definitions of Ellsberg equilibrium are equivalent3.
3This can be shown formally, the proof is available upon request. It goes essentially as
follows. The maxmin expected utility representation with the associated set of probability
distributions Pi ⊆ ∆Si induces for the Ellsberg equilibrium acts f∗ ∈ F a profile P∗ of
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Note that the classical game is contained in our formulation: players just
choose a singleton Pi = {δpii} that puts all weight on a particular (classical)
mixed strategy pi.
Now let (pi1, . . . , pin) be a Nash equilibrium of the game G. Can any
player gain by creating ambiguity in such a situation? No. As players are
pessimistic, they cannot gain by creating ambiguity in a situation where
the other players do not react on this ambiguity because their payoffs do
not depend on it. In particular, pure strategy Nash equilibria are Ellsberg
equilibria.
Proposition 1. Let G = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉i∈N be a normal form game. Then
a mixed strategy profile (pi1, . . . , pin) of G is a Nash equilibrium of G if and
only if the corresponding profile of singletons (P1, . . . ,Pn) with Pi = {δpii} is
an Ellsberg equilibrium.
In particular, Ellsberg equilibria exist. But this is not our point here.
We want to show that interesting, non–Nash behavior can arise in Ellsberg
games. We turn to this issue next.
4 Strategic Use of Ambiguity in Negotiations
Having defined the Ellsberg equilibrium, we return to the peace negotiation
example. We show that there is the following class of Ellsberg equilibria:
the superpower creates ambiguity about its decision. When this ambiguity
is sufficiently large, both players fear that they will be punished by the su-
perpower in case of war. Their best reply is thus to opt for peace.
In the case of just two strategies, we can identify an Ellsberg strategy
of the superpower with an interval [P0, P1] where P ∈ [P0, P1] are the prob-
abilities that the superpower punishes country A. Suppose the superpower







pose that country B opts for peace. If A goes for war, it uses that prior in
[P0, P1] which minimizes its expected payoff, i.e. P1 for country A. This yields
U1(war, war, [P0, P1]) = P1 · 0 + (1 − P1) · 9 < 4. Hence, opting for peace is
sets of probability distributions on the classical mixed strategy sets ∆Si. On the other
hand, to see that every reduced form Ellsberg equilibrium P∗ is an Ellsberg equilibrium,
choose the states of the world Ωi to be the set of mixed strategies ∆Si, and let fi be the
identity map.
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country A’s best reply. The reasoning for country B is similar, but with the
opposite probability P0. If both countries A and B go for peace, the super-
power gets 4 regardless of what it does; in particular, it can play strategically
ambiguously as described above. We conclude that (peace, peace, [P0, P1]) is
a (reduced form) Ellsberg equilibrium.
By using the strategy [P0, P1] which is a set of probability distributions,
player 3 creates ambiguity. This supports an Ellsberg equilibrium with strate-
gies that are not in the support of the unique Nash equilibrium.
Greenberg refers to historic peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt
(countries A and B in the negotiation example) mediated by the USA (su-
perpower C) after the 1973 war. The success of the peace negotiations can
be partly attributed to the fact that both Egypt and Israel were too afraid
to be punished if negotiations broke down. Their fear was fed from diverging
expected consequences, as pointed out by Kissinger (1982)4. These peace ne-
gotiations might be evidence that Ellsberg equililbria can capture real world
phenomena better than Nash equilibria.
5 Strategic Ambiguity as a Mediation Tool
Next we will consider a classic example5 from Aumann (1974), Example 2.3.
He presents a three person game where one player has some mediation power
to influence his opponents’ choice. The original game is given by the payoff
matrix in Figure 3, where we let player 1 choose rows, player 2 choose columns
and player 3 choose matrices.
L R
T 0, 8, 0 3, 3, 3
B 1, 1, 1 0, 0, 0
l
L R
T 0, 0, 0 3, 3, 3
B 1, 1, 1 8, 0, 0
r
Figure 3: Aumann’s Example.
Player 3 is indifferent between his strategies l and r, since he gets the same
payoffs for both. As long as player 3 chooses l with a probability higher than
4See p. 802 therein, in particular.
5This example has also been analyzed in other literature on ambiguity in games, see
Eichberger and Kelsey (2006), Lo (2009) and Bade (2010).
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3/8, L is an optimal strategy for player 2 regardless what player 1 does; and
player 1 would subsequently play B. By the same reasoning, as long as player
3 plays r with a probability higher than 3/8, B is optimal for player 1, and
player 2 plays L then. Thus the Nash equilibria of this game are all of the
form (B,L, P ∗), where P ∗ is any objectively mixed strategy.
The example by Aumann has a nice interpretation. Suppose players 1
and 2 are prisoners, and player 3 the police officer. Let us rearrange the
matrix game and put it in the form displayed in Figure 4. We swap the
strategies of player 2 and rename the strategies of player 1 and 2 to C =
”cooperate” and D = ”defect” as in the classical prisoners’ dilemma. We
can merge the two matrices into one, because the strategy choice of the
police officer is simply the choice of a probability that influences the payoffs
of prisoners 1 and 2 in case of unilateral defection from (C,C). If he chooses
P = 1 this corresponds to strategy l in the original game (i.e. prisoner 2
gets all the reward), P = 0 would be strategy r (i.e. prisoner 1 gets all the
reward). The choice of the objectively mixed strategy P = 1/2 leads to the
classical symmetric prisoners’ dilemma with a payoff of 4 in case of unilateral
defection.
In this interpretation, players 1 and 2 are facing a sort of prisoners’
dilemma situation mediated by a player 3, the police officer. Given the pay-
offs, the police officer is most interested in cooperation between the prisoners.
The police officer can influence how high the reward would be for unilateral
defection by using an objective randomizing device. Nevertheless, in every





C 3, 3, 3 0, 8P, 0
D 8(1− P ), 0, 0 1, 1, 1
Figure 4: Mediated Prisoners’ dilemma
Now suppose we let the players use Ellsberg strategies. The police officer
could create ambiguity by announcing: ”I’m not sure about who of you I
will want to punish and who I will want to reward for reporting on your
partner. I might also reward you both equally... I simply don’t tell you what
mechanism I will use to decide about this.”
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Let us exhibit Ellsberg strategies that support this behavior. If prisoner
2 expects the P to be lower than 3/8 and prisoner 1 expects the P to be
higher than 5/8, they would prefer to cooperate6. This behavior corresponds
to the police officer playing an Ellsberg strategy [P0, P1] with 0 ≤ P0 < 38 and
5
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< P1 ≤ 1. The ambiguity averse prisoners 1 and 2 evaluate their utility
with P = P0 and P = P1 resp. Consequently they would prefer to play
(C,C). This gives an Ellsberg equilibrium in which the prisoners cooperate.
6 Strategic Ambiguity in Competitive Situa-
tions
Let us now consider typical two person games with conflicting interests; in
such a situation, one usually has no strict equilibria. We take a slightly
modified version of Matching Pennies as our example; the results generalize
to all such two person 2 × 2 games as we explain below. The payoff matrix




HEAD 3,−1 −1, 1
TAIL −1, 1 1,−1
Figure 5: Modified Matching Pennies I
We point out that the Ellsberg equilibria in such games are different from
what one might expect first, on the one hand; on the other hand they allow us
to emphasize an important property of Ellsberg games (or ambiguity aversion
in general): the best reply functions are no longer linear in the probabilities.
As a consequence, the indifference principle of classical game theory does
not carry over to Ellsberg games. When a player is indifferent between two
Anscombe–Aumann acts, this does not imply that she is indifferent between
all mixtures over these two acts. This is due to the hedging or diversification
6Aumann (1974) has already commented on this behavior. He observes that (C,C)
can be a ”subjective equilibrium point” if players 1 and 2 have non–common beliefs about
the objectively mixed strategy player 3 is going to use. In his analysis player 1 believes
P = 3/4 and player 2 believes P = 1/4. Note that in Ellsberg equilibrium the players
have the common belief P ∈ [P0, P1].
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effect provided by a (classical) mixed strategy when players are ambiguity–
averse. We call this effect immunization against strategic ambiguity.
In our modified version of Matching Pennies, the unique Nash equilibrium
is that player 1 mixes uniformly over his strategies, and player 2 mixes with
(1/3, 2/3). This yields the equilibrium payoffs 1/3 and 0. One might guess
that one can get an Ellsberg equilibrium where both players use a set of prob-
ability measures around the Nash equilibrium distribution as their strategy.
This is somewhat surprisingly, at least to us, not true. The reason for this
lies in the possibility to immunize oneself against ambiguity; in the modified
Matching Pennies example, player 1 can use the mixed strategy (1/3, 2/3) to
make himself independent of any ambiguity used by the opponent. Indeed,
with this strategy, his expected payoff is 1/3 against any mixed strategy of
the opponent, and a fortiori against Ellsberg strategies as well. This strat-
egy is the unique best reply of player 2 to Ellsberg strategies with ambiguity
around the Nash equilibrium; in particular, such ambiguity is not part of an
Ellsberg equilibrium.
Let us explain this somewhat more formally. An Ellsberg strategy for
player 2 can be identified with an interval [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, 1] where Q ∈ [Q0, Q1]
is the probability to play HEAD. Suppose player 2 uses many probabilities
around 1/3, so Q0 < 1/3 < Q1. The (minimal) expected payoff for player 1
when he uses the mixed strategy with probability P for “HEAD” is then
min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
3PQ− P (1−Q)− (1− P )Q+ (1− P )(1−Q)
= min {Q0(6P − 2) + 1− 2P,Q1(6P − 2) + 1− 2P}
=

Q1(6P − 2) + 1− 2P if P < 1/3
1/3 if P = 1/3
Q0(6P − 2) + 1− 2P else
.
By choosing the mixed strategy P = 1/3, player 1 becomes immune
against any ambiguity and ensures the (Nash) equilibrium payoff of 1/3. If
there was an Ellsberg equilibrium with P0 < 1/2 < P1 and Q0 < 1/3 < Q1,
then the minimal expected payoff would be below 1/3. Hence, such Ellsberg
equilibria do not exist.
Such immunization plays frequently a role in two person games, and it
need not always be the Nash equilibrium strategy that plays this role. Con-
sider, e.g., the slightly changed payoff matrix





HEAD 1,−1 −1, 1
TAIL −2, 1 1,−1
Figure 6: Modified Matching Pennies II
probability 1/2 (to render player 2 indifferent); however, in order to be im-
mune against Ellsberg strategies, he has to play HEAD with probability 3/5.
Then his payoff is −1/5 regardless of what player II does. This strategy does
not play any role in either Nash or Ellsberg equilibrium. It is only important
in so far as it excludes possible Ellsberg equilibria by being the unique best
reply to some Ellsberg strategies.
The question thus arises if there are any Ellsberg equilibria different from
the Nash equilibrium at all. There are, and they take the following form
for our first version of modified Matching Pennies (Figure 5). Player 1 plays
HEAD with probability P ∈ [1/2, P1] for some 1/2 ≤ P1 ≤ 1 and player 2
plays HEAD with probability Q ∈ [1/3, Q1] for some 1/3 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1/2. This
Ellsberg equilibrium yields the same payoffs 1/3 and 0 as in Nash equilibrium.
We prove a more general theorem covering this case in the appendix7.
The Ellsberg equilibrium strategy thus takes the following form. Player
1 says :“I will play HEAD with a probability of at least 50 %, but not less.”
And Player 2 replies: “I will play HEAD with at least 33 %, but not more
than 50 %.” A larger class of ambiguity thus supports equilibrium behavior
in such games.
Whereas the support of the Ellsberg and Nash equilibria is obviously the
same, we do think that the Ellsberg equilibria reveal a new class of behavior
not encountered in game theory before. It might be very difficult for humans
to play exactly a randomizing strategy with equal probabilities (indeed, some
claim that this is impossible, see Dang (2009) and references therein). Our
result shows that it is not necessary to randomize exactly to support a simi-
lar equilibrium outcome (with the same expected payoff). It is just enough
that your opponent knows that you are randomizing with some probability,
and that it could be that this probability is one half, but not less. It is thus
sufficient that the player is able to control the lower bound of his random-
7Note that in zero–sum games there are no Ellsberg equilibria in which both players
create ambiguity. We comment on this in the appendix.
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izing device. This might be easier to implement than the perfectly random
behavior required in classical game theory.
In addition there are experimental findings which suggest that the Ells-
berg equilibrium strategy in the modified Matching Pennies game is closer to
real behavior than the Nash equilibrium prediction. In an experiment run by
Goeree and Holt (2001), 50 subjects play a one-shot version of the modified




HEAD 320, 40 40, 80
TAIL 40, 80 80, 40
Figure 7: Modified Matching Pennies III
The Nash equilibrium prediction of the game is ((1/2, 1/2) , (1/8, 7/8)),
but in the experiment row players deviate considerably from this equilibrium.
24 of the 25 row players choose to play HEAD, and only one chooses TAIL.
Furthermore, four of the column players choose HEAD, the other 21 choose
to play TAIL; the aggregate observation for column players is thus closer to
the Nash equilibrium strategy.
Applying the Ellsberg analysis of the modified Matching Pennies game
to the payoffs of Goeree and Holt (2001)’s experiment yields an Ellsberg
equilibrium
([1/2, P1] , [1/8, Q1]) with 1/2 ≤ P1 ≤ 1 and 1/8 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1/2.
One possible equilibrium strategy of player 1 is the set of probabilities [1/2, 1]
to play HEAD. The aggregate observation in the experiment (that player 1
chooses HEAD with higher probability than TAIL) is thus consistent with
the Ellsberg equilibrium strategy.
7 Conclusion
This article demonstrates that the strategic use of ambiguity is a relevant con-
cept in game theory. Employing ambiguity as a strategic instrument leads
to a new class of equilibria not encountered in classic game theory. We point
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out that players may choose to be deliberately ambiguous to gain a strategic
advantage. In some games this results in equilibrium outcomes which can
not be obtained as Nash equilibria.
Bade (2010) proves that in two person normal form games under some
weak assumptions on the preferences Ellsberg equilibria always have the same
support as some Nash equilibrium8. This changes as soon as one allows for
three or more players. The peace negotiation example as well as the mediated
prisoners’ dilemma suggest that the resulting non–Nash behavior can be of
economic relevance.
The point in having more than two players is that in the example su-
perpower C is able to induce the use of different probability distributions.
Although countries A and B observe the same Ellsberg strategy, due to their
ambiguity aversion modeled by maxmin expected utility the countries use
different probability distributions to assess their utility. This strategic pos-
sibility does not arise in two person games.
Nevertheless, 2×2 games have Ellsberg equilibria which are conceptually
different from classic mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We analyze a special
class of these games, where the players have conflicting interests. These
games have equilibria in which both players create ambiguity. They use an
Ellsberg strategy where they only need to control the lower (or upper) bound
of their set of probability distributions.
We argue that this randomizing device is easier to use for a player than
playing one precise probability distribution like in mixed strategy Nash equi-
librium. What makes this argument attractive is on the one hand that the
payoffs in these Ellsberg equilibria are the same as in the unique mixed Nash
equilibrium and thus the use of ambiguous strategies in competitive games is
indeed an option. On the other hand, comparing with experimental results,
we point out that in the modified Matching Pennies game Ellsberg equilib-
rium strategies are consistent with the experimentally observed behavior.
We believe that the use of Ellsberg urns as randomizing devices is a
tangible concept that does not involve more (or even less) sophistication than
single probability distributions and, in connection with ambiguity–aversion,
8For maxmin expected utility preferences like in our model this result holds under the
assumption that all beliefs in the sets Pi are mutually absolutely continuous. All beliefs
Pi ∈ Pi are mutually absolutely continuous when Pi(ω) > 0 for some Pi ∈ Pi holds if and
only if P ′i (ω) > 0 for all P
′
i ∈ Pi and all ω ∈ Ω.
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adds a new dimension to the analysis of strategic interaction. Ellsberg games
need to be explored further to fully characterize the strategic possibilities that
ambiguity offers.
A Competitive 2× 2 Games
We provide here the promised proposition on 2× 2 games.




U a, d b, e
D b, e c, f
such that








denote the Nash equilibrium strategies for player 1 and 2, resp. The Ellsberg
equilibria of the game are of the following form:
If Q∗ < P ∗, then the Ellsberg equilibria are
([P ∗, P1], [Q∗, Q1])
for P ∗ ≤ P1 ≤ 1, Q∗ ≤ Q1 ≤ P ∗;
and if P ∗ < Q∗, then the Ellsberg equilibria are
([P0, P
∗], [Q0, Q∗])
for 0 ≤ P0 ≤ P ∗, P ∗ ≤ Q0 ≤ Q∗.
Proof. The Nash equilibrium strategies follow from the usual analysis. The
conditions on the payoffs assure that the Nash equilibrium is completely
mixed, i.e. 0 < P ∗ < 1 and 0 < Q∗ < 1. Let now [P0, P1] and [Q0, Q1] be
Ellsberg strategies of player 1 and 2, where P ∈ [P0, P1] is the probability of
player 1 to play U , and Q ∈ [Q0, Q1] is the probability of player 2 to play L.
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aPQ+ bP (1−Q) + b(1− P )Q+ c(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
Q0≤Q≤Q1
Q(b− c+ P (a− 2b+ c)) + bP + c− cP
=

Q1(b− c+ P (a− 2b+ c)) + bP + c− cP if P < c−ba−2b+c
ac−b2
a−2b+c if P =
c−b
a−2b+c
Q0(b− c+ P (a− 2b+ c)) + bP + c− cP else
.
Player 1’s utility is constant at ac−b
2









∗, and for all P ∈ [ c−b
a−2b+c , 1
]




∗. This means that player 1’s best response to a strat-
egy [Q0, Q
∗] where 0 ≤ Q0 ≤ Q∗ is [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, Q∗], and player 1’s best
response to a strategy [Q∗, Q1] where Q∗ ≤ Q1 ≤ 1 is [P0, P1] ⊆ [Q∗, 1].
We do the same analysis for player 2. His maxmin expected utility when he
plays the mixed strategy Q is
min
P0≤P≤P1
dPQ+ eP (1−Q) + e(1− P )Q+ f(1− P )(1−Q)
= min
P0≤P≤P1
P (e− f +Q(d− 2e+ f)) + eQ+ f − fQ
=

P0(e− f +Q(d− 2e+ f)) + eQ+ f − fQ if Q < f−ed−2e+f
df−e2
d−2e+f if Q =
f−e
d−2e+f
P1(e− f +Q(d− 2e+ f)) + eQ+ f − fQ else
.
Player 2’s utility is constant at df−e
2


















∗. This means player 2’s best response to a strategy [P ∗, P1]
where P ∗ ≤ P1 ≤ 1 is [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, P ∗], and player 2’s best response to a
strategy [P0, P
∗] where 0 ≤ P0 ≤ P ∗ is [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [P ∗, 1].
We calculate the intersections of the best response functions to find the




∗, Q1]) = [P0, P1] ⊆ [Q∗, 1]
2. B1([Q0, Q
∗]) = [P0, P1] ⊆ [0, Q∗]
3. B2([P
∗, P1]) = [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, P ∗]
4. B2([P0, P
∗]) = [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [P ∗, 1]
We assume that Q∗ < P ∗. Suppose player 2 plays [Q∗, Q1], then if we let
player 1 choose [P0, P1] = [P
∗, P1] with P ∗ ≤ P1 ≤ 1 player 2 would play any
strategy [Q0, Q1] ⊆ [0, P ∗] as a best response. If he picks [Q0, Q1] = [Q∗, Q1]
with Q∗ ≤ Q1 ≤ P ∗ this is an Ellsberg equilibrium, i.e.
([P ∗, P1], [Q∗, Q1]) where P ∗ ≤ P1 ≤ 1 and Q∗ ≤ Q1 ≤ P ∗.
In the case Q∗ < P ∗ this is the only type of Ellsberg equilibrium in which
both players play subjectively mixed strategies.
When we assume that P ∗ < Q∗, we get a similar type of Ellsberg equilib-
rium. Suppose player 2 plays [Q0, Q
∗], then if we let player 1 pick [P0, P1] ⊆
[P0, P
∗] with 0 ≤ P0 < P ∗, player 2’s best response is any subset [Q0, Q1] ⊆
[P ∗, 1]. If he chooses [Q0, Q1] = [Q0, Q∗] with P ∗ ≤ Q0 ≤ Q∗, then this is an
Ellsberg equilibrium, i.e.
([P0, P
∗], [Q0, Q∗]) where 0 ≤ P0 < P ∗ and P ∗ ≤ Q0 ≤ Q ∗ .
Remark 1. 1. In proposition 2 we restrict to the case with (U,D) and
(L,R) giving the same payoffs (b, e) for both players. Of course the
Ellsberg equilibria of competitive games with more general payoffs can
easily be calculated. The nice feature of our restriction is that in Ellsberg
equilibrium players use the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy of their
respective opponent as upper (or lower) bound of their Ellsberg strategy.
2. Note that for Q∗ = P ∗ there is no such equilibrium where both players
create ambiguity. In this case their best response functions intersect
only at the Nash equilibrium distribution. What we get are (apart from
the Nash equilibrium) only the two Ellsberg equilibria where one player
hedges against the ambiguity of the other. These are, if we call the
symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy R∗,




∗) where P0 ≤ R∗ ≤ P1.
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